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An Empirical Test of The Market Relaxation - State
Compression Hypothesis
Christopher B. Barrett*

Introduction
A central aim of agricultural liberalization efforts in African countries -has been to
improve farmers' incentives so as to stimulate productivity and growth. But
policymakers have little if any direct economic contact with farmers. Rather, if policy
reforms are to influence individuals' behavior through changes to price incentives, then
markets must transmit intended, stimulative signals throughout the economy. Yet market
conditions are endogenous to the liberalization process. In particular, the extent to which
spatially and temporally distinct markets are integrated can change sharply with
fundamental policy reforms. This paper empirically tests these effects, examining how
liberalization efforts in the 1980s affected spatial and temporal food market integration in
Madagascar.
What is market integration? In the space domain, if a shock to the price of a
commoditY in one market due to purely local demand or supply perturbations becomes
manifest in another market's price, then the two are said to be_"integrated." This is
closely to the concept of "tradability," as commonly applied to international trade. In
contrast, if shocks to one market's price are never felt in another market, the two are
proclaimed not integrated, or "segmented," with obvious implications of nontradability.
If two markets are perfectly integrated with respect to a particular commodity, there
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should be a one-to-one correspondence between the two price series, while if they are
perfectly segmented, their price series should be statistically independent. In the time
domain, the concept of tradability implies an intertemporal arbitrage condition: that the
rate at which prices increase over time equals the ratio of the real interest rate to the
depreciation (loss) rate, appropriately adjusted for risk effects.) Analogously, substantial
deviations from the intertemporal arbitrage condition imply market segmentation across
time periods.
The notion of market integration thus really concerns the free flow of goods and
infonnation -

which together detennine prices- over space and time. Hence its close

relationship to concepts of efficiency. Government interference often impedes such
flows, thereby inducing inefficiencies. Hence one motivation for market liberalization.
Moreover, the efficacy of policy measures that rely on changing (relative) prices to
induce behavioral change depends fundamentally on the strength of transmission of
market price signals across space and over time. If markets are not integrated spatially,
the cross-sectional aggregation of demand and supply that is central to sectoral and
macroeconomic analysis loses its logical foundation, and state-initiated signals may have
little or no effect on local prices and behaviors. Similarly, if markets are not seasonally
integrated, intertemporal aggregation of demand and supply becomes artificial, and
seasonal cycles in income and prices become especially important determinants of
consumption and production behaviors.
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Simply put, segmented markets demand more costly, disaggregated analysis.
Moreover, segmented markets are more likely to require relaxation of the convenient
assumption of perfectly competitive markets, if only because smaller markets are more
susceptible to the emergence of natural monopolies due to the minimum efficient scale of
intermediation (e.g., transport, bulk storage) technologies. As recent developments in
macroeconomic and trade theory vividly demonstrate, a break from the standard
assumption of perfectly competitive markets can have monumental impacts on model
results and policy implications.
There is long-standing and widespread observation of serious infrastructural
obstacles -

of both the physical and institutional sorts -

to market interlinkages and

efficient agricultural price transmission in African rural markets. For instance, the World
Bank's [1989] long-term perspective study on African development states that
"improving rural infrastructure is an essential requirement for the modernization and
growth of agriculture. Better market incentives to farmers will be blunted if the physical
barriers and economic costs of transporting goods to and from local markets are too high"
[p.103].
Heavy-handed state interventions in the pricing, interregional movement and
interseasonal storage of agricultural commodities have drawn equally long and critical
attention as impediments to more efficient marketing. State agricultural marketing
boards often become illiquid or run out of sacks, vehicles or storage capacity.
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Consequently, the spatial and temporal extent of state activities has often been limited
and inappropriate, forcing many consumers and producers onto an illegal parallel market.
In the opinion of Harriss [1979a, p.371], state interventions in Africa "induce spatial
compartmentaliza-tion" despite the common rhetoric of panterritorial and panseasonal
integration and equity. Government authority often exceeds the limits of both its
technical competence and its agents' self-restraint, leading to inconsistent application of
administrative pricing and distribution rules, and widespread rent-seeking. "Chronic
problems of dis-coordination and discretionary decision-making play into the hands of
large private traders (who may also be bureaucrats)" [Harriss 1979a, p.371]. Meanwhile,
the efficiency of the parallel, private market is often low. Widespread government
restrictions on private marketing activities dampen trade and generally force traders to
parcelize activities so as to avoid detection, at the expense of higher unit transfer costs
due to considerable risk premia and volumes suboptimal for the technologies involved.
In summary, state intervention and corruption often facilitate the emergence and
consolidatIon of private monopolies and the disintegration of comprehensive national
distribution networks, exacerbating the very problems market regulation is supposed to
alleviate.
The issues of poor infrastructure and governance are also related. In many
African nations, the publicly developed marketing infrastructure was ill-suited to interregional trade, as distinct from evacuation of export crops to port, in both the colonial and
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post-independence periods. More generally, poor delivery of services, due often to
incoherent provision of infrastructure and inadequate maintenance, has often impeded the
emergence of efficient, responsive trading networks.
In the ideal world, economic reforms can simultaneously tackle both governance
and infrastructure problems, and in a few settings it seems they have. 2 But in much of
Africa agricultural liberalization efforts have addressed only failed government
interventions in agricultural marketing, not the substantial bottlenecks created by
insufficient and low-quality infrastructure. This has had adverse consequences for
agricultural supply response, as World Bank analysts acknowledge: "recent experience
indicates that supply response of structural adjustment operations has been stifled by
rural transport deficiencies" [Riverson, Gaviria and Thurscott 1991, p.ix]. Some
commentators even argue that the fiscal retrenchment synonymous with liberalization has
exacerbated infrastructural problems [Longhurst 1987; Mosley and Smith 1989], which
leads to an intriguing hypothesis.

Market Relaxation and State Compression
Michael Lipton [1990, 1991] has perhaps most clearly conceptualized the
potential tension inherent in contemporary efforts to improve market performance in
Africa. Lipton characterizes liberalization as consisting of two distinct, countervailing
impulses. The first, market relaxation, loosens or eliminates state restrictions on private
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sector activity.3 The movement away from controlled pricing and physical movement of
commodities tends to open up space for private intermediaries to operate freely, openly
and competitively, with potentially positive consequences for smallholders' welfare,
agricultural production and marketing volumes, and the economy as a whole . .
Meanwhile, however, the bias in most structural adjustment operations toward
minimizing the state's role in the economy,4 which Lipton labels "state compression", can
generate opposing effects that might choke off nascent competition and efficiency gains.
State compression has four dimensions. First, reduced expenditure on public goods
infrastructure and services (e.g., maintenance of roads, and bridges, extension services,
phytosanitary controls, rural policing) forces private industry to bear more of these costs
alone. This naturally leads to socially suboptimal supply. Increasing undersupply can
undo the good work done by market relaxation if, for example, roads become impassable
or marketable production suffers from preventable epidemiological disasters.
Second, sharp real reductions in government salaries increase local authorities'
propensityito extort bribes and otherwise obstruct liberalization efforts. 5 There have been
noteworthy rearguard actions by bureaucrats and local government functionaries to
impede liberalization in several African nations, including Madagascar. Even though
central governments declare trade free everywhere, some local authorities have
introduced their own restrictions, sometimes in the name of local food security, but often
blatantly to bolster declining real government salaries or to maintain incumbents' market
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or neopatrimonial political power [Barrett 1994a, Berg 1989, Coulter 1994].
Third, restrictive monetary policy and tightened banking prudential oversight
practices explicitly seek to increase real interest rates and improve the solvency of
financial institutions, with an eye toward expanding the deposit base of the national
banking system. But by making credit more expensive, and often less accessible for
private marketing intermediaries in rural areas, these tendencies can inhibit entry and
restrict the capacity of intermediaries to invest in capital equipment (e.g., trucks, silos,
electrical mills) for long-term efficiency gains, or even in commodity inventories for
interseasonal arbitrage. Panseasonal pricing, even where relatively ineffective, created
disincentives to investment in and maintenance of bulk storage capacity. One legacy of
the dirigiste era is thus widespread shortage of private, commercial bulk storage facilities,
thereby inhibiting interseasonal arbitrage. Thin markets contribute to price volatility,
which discourages prudent lending and investment in the presence of sunk costs, which
thin markets further. A vicious cycle easily begins. With parastatals no longer
stockpiling large quantities of basic foodgrains and few private merchants holding more
than transactional stocks, many observers maintain that most interseasonal storage is now
carried out by farmers themselves [Christiansen and Stackhouse 1989; Coulter and Golob
1992; Coulter 1994]. However, with rudimentary storage technologies, physical loss
rates can be substantial, in many cases much larger than when state marketing boards
managed stocks poorly in excessively modem and urban facilities.
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Finally, for all their drawbacks, state marketing boards did provide some services
that must be replaced, perhaps even extended, in the wake of state withdrawal from
agricultural marketing. Publicly declared .prices often provided the only baseline market
price information service, reaching at least those regions where parastatals were active.
The need for market price information services has been emphasized by Coulter [1994],
Staatz, Dione and Dembele [1989] and Jones [1972], among others, but has only recently
found acceptance among governments and donors despite the relatively low cost of
service provision. Credit for farmers' purchase of modem inputs, and even for hungry
season consumption goods, was often extended as an advance against cash receipts from
later produce sales when the state had a working monopsony. Where liberalization has
opened up competition in farm-level crop purchasing, it has sometimes, as in parts of
Madagascar, Senegal and Zaire, also had the unfortunate effect of discouraging seasonal
credit [Thomas and Reintsma 1989; Thompson 1991; Barrett 1994b]. For reasons
described above, the financial sector is often unable to pick up the slack left by
parastatalsf retreat. Finally, pre-liberalization informal trading tended to be based more
on personal relationships within which informal contract enforcement mechanisms exist.
The depersonalization of exchange relations inherent in freed markets extends marketing
intermediaries' commercial reach without necessarily simultaneously extending the extralegal protection of contracts [platteau 1994a, 1994b]. Parastatals had the dubious benefit
of state power behind them to help enforce marketing contracts. 6
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In summary, if African agricultural market liberalization is aimed at facilitating
private trade so as to enhance market integration and harness the Walrasian efficiency of
free market pricing, such reforms likely demand not just the diminution of state
restrictions on private sector activity, but equally the rehabilitation, maintenance and
extension of supporting infrastructure and services through complementary investments
[Barrett and Carter 1994; Staatz et al. 1993; Yao and Hay 1991]. The need is to build up
competitive marketing channels where they were long suppressed. Where ex ante state
controls were effective and injurious, aggressive dismantling ·o f parastatal structures may
be central to attainment of that goal. In other cases, including where state controls were
relatively ineffective, state compression may be a subordinate concern to issues of
infrastructure and finance for, as Yao and Hay [1991, p.86] put it, "the assumption that
mechanisms for state intervention can be dismantled quickly because private traders will
be willing and able to move into vacated markets is not substantiated by experience. 117

Markets and Liberalization in Madagascar

Madagascar provides a useful setting to explore these claims empirically. State
involvement in food marketing, which was considerable but varied in efficacy across
regions and commodities, diminished sharply in the latter half of the 1980s, but provision
of public goods and services generally did not expand (indeed probably diminished in
most locations) with liberalization. Examination of how liberalization affected spatial
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and intertemporal market integration, taking care to control appropriately for the ex ante
conditions of commodity- and region-specific markets, offers an enlightening empirical
test of the market relaxation - state compression hypothesis.
From 1973 the Malagasy government enforced a legal monopsony in the purchase
of rice, manioc, maize and dried beans (as well as several commodities not considered
here), and a monopoly in the distribution, processing and commercial storage of those
commodities. The state's hold on these markets varied across regions, time and
commodities. With respect to rice, the principal crop, AIRD [1984] estimated official
purchases at 10-20 percent of domestic paddy production. With the marketed proportion
of production generally believed to be about one-quarter, the official marketing channel
probably controlled half or more of marketed rice, quite a high figure. An enforcement
agency, the Brigade Mixte d'Intervention Economique (BMIE), seized illegal stocks,
usually of rice, and arrested those caught or suspected of trading illegally. The BMIE's
operations, as well as those of the state marketing boards, were concentrated in the
regions around the five principal cities (Antananarivo, Antsirabe, Fianarantsoa,
Mahajanga, and Toamasina)8 and the main rice producing region (Ambatondrazaka). If
market relaxation enhances intertemporal or spatial market integration, one would expect
measurable improvements where government controls were strongest and only weak
effects, if any, where government exercised little control.
State restrictions over food marketing were wholly eliminated over the span of a
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few years in the mid-1980s. Domestic and international trade in foods was fully opened
to competition, government price controls and consumer subsidies were loosened then
eliminated, and several of the larger public agricultural enterprises were disbanded or
privatized. International observers such as the IMF, World Bank and USAID .celebrated
the breadth and depth of Madagascar's market-oriented reforms [Barrett 1994a].
Yet while state interventions in agricultural marketing receded markedly, the
Malagasy state has continuously neglected rural infrastructure over the past two decades,
as detailed below. With the exception of only a few enclaves, there has been no
significant infrastructural improvement to accompany state withdrawal from agricultural
marketing. If the market relaxation-state compression hypothesis is true compression can choke off nascent gains from market relaxation -

that state

one would expect to

see little if any improvement in market integration indicators among those regions where
infrastructure has been and remains underdeveloped.

Spatial Market Integration
We can test the market relaxation-state compression hypotheses, as well as get a
strong indication of the degree to which price shocks are transmitted across spatially
distinct geographical markets, by considering the effects of liberalization measures on
market integration. Unfortunately, there are no compelling methods available for such
testing [Harriss 1979b; McNew 1994; Barrett forthcoming], so I rely on simple
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techniques applied to monthly retail food price data from each of Madagascar's 17
agricultural enumeration areas. 9 Common inflationary and seasonal trends in the regional
price data were removed from the data by deflating the nominal data by the national
consumer price index, then deseasonalizing using the ratio-to-moving-average method. 10
This cleaning renders the data stationary, so all the series are trivially co integrated,
eliminating that increasingly popular method and Ravallion's[ 1986] error-correction
mechanism specification as testing options. Consequently, bivariate correlation
coefficients among the deflated, deseasonalized price series form the basis for the present
analysis. These correlations are computed both on the price levels and on their first
differences, so as to adjust for autocorrelation. 11
The regional price series for each commodity were divided into two groups
accordingly to ex ante market conditions: seven (more urban) regions where the state's
marketing presence was pronounced and infrastructure is relatively good,I2 and ten
regions where the state's marketing presence was never as pervasive and the
infrastructUre was and remains relatively poor. The analysis that follows addresses three
distinct questions concerning spatial market integration: (1) how strong are intermarket
prices linkages? This offers a good indicator of the extent of the central government's
influence through price-based policy measures. (2) Have liberalization measures
improved market integration? Finally, (3), have the effects of liberalization differed
between the "primary regions", where state control had been significant and infrastructure
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is functional, and the "secondary regions" , where state control was much weaker and
infrastructure was and remains quite decrepit?
Table 1 presents the proportions of sample correlation coefficients between
regional price levels that were statistically significantly greater than zero ("minimally
integrated") pre- and post-liberalization, that were greater than 0.713 ("reasonably well
integrated") pre- and post-liberalization, and that experienced statistically significant
changes with liberalization, either negative or positive. These results are reported in
three panels: market integration within primary regions, between primary and secondary
regions, then within secondary regions. Several findings are immediately apparent.
First, other than for rice, most of the market pairs were not even minimally
integrated before liberalization, while considerably more were after liberalization.
Except for manioc, all the primary region market pairs were minimally integrated for
each crop post-liberalization, and at least 80 percent were minimally integrated with
secondary region markets as well. This would appear to suggest liberalization brought at
least minimal, broadly-based interconnectedness. Within secondary regions, the
proportion of minimally integrated markets was unambiguously lower post-liberalization
than within primary regions, indicating that infrastructural obstacles in more remote
regions remained a serious impediment to marketing efficiency.
Statistical tests for a structural change in correlation coefficients also showed
positive improvements in a substantial number of series linked to primary regions. Note,
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however, that the secondary regions consistently have a lower proportion of market pairs
showing positive structural shifts than do the primary regions; indeed, many evince
market disintegration. As hypothesized, liberalization's positive, market relaxation
impacts appear to have been most concentrated where the state's influence, ex ante, and
the quality and density of infrastructure, ex post, were greatest. The proportions of
correlation coefficients exceeding 0.70 likewise suggest an important jump in market
integration among primary region markets, but much less so among secondary region
markets. The law of one price seems to apply only to a spatial subset of Malagasy food
markets. Moreover, with the exception of rice and dried beans within the primary region
markets, less than half of the market pairs are reasonably well integrated (defined as r >
0.70), and only ten percent of the market pairs within secondary region markets are
reasonably well integrated. From these results it would seem that liberalization had
mildly positive, commodity- and, especially, regionally-differentiated effects on market
integration, but that domestic food markets remain only weakly integrated with one
another, substantially limiting the capacity of central government price policy to
influence the incentives faced by farmers in the hinterland.
One concern regarding the correlations underlying Table 1 is that parallel
econometric work [Barrett 1994c] indicates that the autocorrelation of the univariate food
price series jumped markedly with liberalization. Autocorrelation inflates the estimated
correlation coefficients, so the sample statistics presented in Table 1 are likely upper
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bounds on the true population correlations. One simple way to address this problem is to
correlate the first differences of the regional price series [Stigler and Sherwin 1985]. One
is then explicitly measuring the extent to which price shocks in one market are
contemporaneously felt in the other market. Of course, since the series were already
stationary, this method "over-differences" the data, so the corresponding figures likely
present lower bound estimates to juxtapose the upper bound estimates in Table 1.
Table 2 replicates the statistics of Table 1, now for correlations among firstdifferenced series. The story changes noticeably. Now liberalization still

s~ems

to have

net positive, but quite limited effects. No more than one-fifth of the market pairs for any
commodity were minimally integrated prior to liberalization, and the proportion improves
only moderately, to a maximum of 67 percent (for rice within the primary regions) with
liberalization. Within the primary region, there is noticeable (if rarely statistically
significant) improvement in minimal market integration. But in the secondary regions
the proportion of minimally integrated market pairs falls for two commodities and is
unchanged"for the other two. The proportion of statistically significant structural changes
in correlation coefficients is quite small for all commodities and regions. Perhaps most
significantly, no market pairs' first-differenced prices exhibit a correlation coefficient
exceeding 0.70 in either period. These lower bound estimates suggest minimal impacts
from liberalization, with perhaps some positive impacts in primary regions largely offset
by market disintegration in secondary regions. These figures thus tell a less positive
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story than those of Table 1, suggesting that liberalization was rather ineffective in
improving intermarket price efficiency, and, consequently, that government price policy
is unlikely to be a very effective tool for eliciting desired production, consumption or
marketing responses in the market environment of contemporary Madagascar. Between
the two bounding sets of estimates, the general impression is that spatial market
integration improved substantially more in the primary regions than in the secondary
ones, but remains sharply limited in both.

Continuing Obstacles To Food Market Integration
The market for dried beans provides an interesting demonstration of the difficulty
of reversing state takeover of a marketing channel. 14 The bean market was completely
free, and characterized by vertically integrated private trading operations (from farmgate
collection through urban distribution) until the state vested itself with legal monopoly
powers in bean marketing in 1973. Some existing bean traders became collectors for the
state societies, but most appear to have left the market entirely. From about 1986,
officially free competition returned. But in the meantime, both rural infrastructure and
security had degraded. Without established interregional correspondent networks, and
faced with significant costs and risks to operating outside their own locale, bean traders
have become quite localized, with just a few very large wholesalers making the ruralurban linkages. Wholesalers are reluctant to extend cash advances to collectors, both due
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to a lack of repayment enforcement mechanisms and to rural insecurity in the principal
bean-growing areas of the western highlands. So while private trade has recovered, it is
now far more fractured, with greater transactions costs, than before nationalization. The
period of parastatal control has had a lasting impact on the way markets organize
presently, with significant consequences for price transmission and trading efficiency.
Liberalization brought an end to a quantity-rationed state distribution network and
the resulting composite market system that had prevailed for the preceding decade or so.
There now appears to be increased competition at the collection, processing and retailing
levels of the food marketing chains, and the marketing network extends further into the
countryside than it had previously [Abt Associates 1991; World Bank 1991 a; my
unpublished data]. But there is little evidence of increased competition in regions where
transport and communications infrastructure remain substantially inoperative, nor at the
wholesaler level, at which most interregional trade and interseasonal commercial storage
takes place in Madagascar [Abt Associates 1991].
Continued inefficient government control over fuel distribution has led to
widespread shortages of diesel in rural areas (and of gasoline in urban ones). Meanwhile
regular shortages of foreign exchange have shrunk the supply of vehicles and spare parts.
Government activity thus continues to hamper transport.
Moreover, in many areas local governments continue to enforce restrictions on the
physical movement and pricing of food commodities. Berg [1989, p.727] reports
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"propensities to stifle competition are strong and widespread, emanating especially from
the trading and rice producing parastatals and local officials," and recounts stories of road
closings by FIF ABE officials in the Maravoay basin during the 1985 harvest and
collusion among officials in the Lac Alaotra area in the year immediately following the
termination of SOMALAC's legal monopoly. Azam et al. [1993] report similar stories
from the far west and north, and Abt Associates [1991] offer further anecdotes. It has
clearly been difficult to transition to a free market system.
Roads remain a serious problem to food marketing and thus to price transmittal
and elicitation of a sustainable agricultural supply response. 15 Bad roads inhibit the
evacuation of agricultural commodities, especially from more remote areas, and impede
the timely delivery of modern inputs and incentive consumer goods. Poor roads also
facilitate the oligopsonistic organization of collection, 16 which dampens supply
responsiveness by depressing farmers' returns. Szal [1988, p.749] claims that "producer
prices play less of a motivational role in production decisions than the lack of inputs and
poor transport," and that this contention is supported by regression analysis. The WorId
Bank [1991b, p.2] states bluntly that "the overall condition of rural roads remains dismal.
At present, about 90 percent of the estimated 40,000 kilometers are in bad to fair
condition." UND P IMEP [1991] estimated that less than one percent of all roads are
asphalted (declining from 1.7 percent in the Highlands to 0.2 percent in the far north and
south). Pryor [1990] could find no evidence of a comprehensive government
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transportation plan because "according to the Director of the Planning Office, the
government 'forgot' to provide normal funds for road maintenance" [p.322].
Where the government has more recently attempted to consolidate and improve
the rural roads network, it has often met with fierce resistance from local governments,
for two main reasons. First, banditry (dahalo) is widely believed to have increased
substantially in the 1980s,I7 and many fokontany leadership councils express a belief that
better roads will only make their villages less defensible. 18 Second, poor infrastructure
protects the profitable oligopsony/oligopoly positions of many local elites by impeding
entry by outsiders [Barrett 1994a]. There are thus incentives at the local government
level to avoid rehabilitation and maintenance of roads that might improve producer
incentives and market integration.
It is not just the infrastructure that is in bad shape. Berthelemy [1988], citing

Ministry of Transport data, reports that the average age of the stock of road haulage
equipment was greater than ten years, and half was out of commission in the mid-1980s.
The disincentives created by panterritorial official pricing and foreign exchange rationing
during the 1970s and early 1980s effectively choked off replacement- much less
expansion -

of Madagascar's rolling stock in the pre-liberalization era. The legacy

bequeathed to the post-reform era is one of transport bottlenecks that inihibit competition
and trade. Vehicle operating costs on poorly maintained roads are almost half again as
much as on good ones [Barrett 1994b]. Moreover, poor roads routinely become
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impassable, especially in the rainy season, requiring evacuation by draught animal or
headloading, at two to ten times the cost of motorized transport, respectively [Abt
Associates 1991; World Bank 1991b]. The World Bank [1991b] concludes that
"the rural roads sub-sector ... has not been affected by the policy reform
efforts. The poor condition of roads still requires emphasis on complete
rehabilitation. On-going projects, although allocating a substantial
amount of resources, are proceeding independently outside a rational
framework for intervention. As a result, the roads rehabilitated under
several on-going rural road projects have little prospects of receiving any
maintenance" [p.5]

In light of these substantial, continuing infrastructural and institutional obstacles,
it is perhaps unsurprising that Madagascar's food markets appear only weakly integrated
overall, with quite economically isolated enclaves. The capacity of government policies
to affect prices in a predictable, stimulative manner cannot be great under such
circumstances, with a distinctly limited effective geographic range.

Intertemporal Market Integration

Matters are no better when one considers the effects of liberalization on
interseasonal price variability. Azam et al. [1993] and the World Bank [1991a] report
substantial seasonal price increases, apparently well in excess of borrowing and storage
costs estimated at from 20-40 percent. They attribute this chiefly to insufficient credit
available to traders. The World Bank [1991a] estimates that rice obtains more than 80
percent of all agricultural trading credit. Even so, less than 25 percent of marketed rice is
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financed by bank credits, with almost 90 percent of the credit going to just three
geographic regions. Credit controls imposed by the Central Bank the commercial bank with the broadest network -

especially on BTM,

have seriously impinged on

borrowing by rural marketing agents. This has important implications for interseasonal
storage and price stability. Most large rice traders only collect paddy in the countryside
for 4-6 months each year, although some smaller traders continue in areas where the
roads are good until the heaviest rains come in December. But during the depth of the
soudure, December-March, farmers must transport paddy to market themselves, so there
is a certain seasonality to market integration. Azam et al. [1993] conclude that
liberalization did not improve interseasonal price patterns. Indeed the data in Table 3
suggest that once one controls for the effects of a seasonal rice buffer stock facility
introduced in late 1986 and terminated in 1990, liberalization brought sharp increases in
interseasonal price variability.
If one takes the year-specific seasonal indices generated by the ratio-to-moving
average method of deseasonalizing the regional real commodity price series for spatial
market integration testing, and calculates the maximum/minimum ratio of the monthly
indices, an estimate of the average intra-annual price increase emerges. Table 3 presents
these estimates for three distinct periods: pre-liberalization (1983-85), the period of rice
buffer stock operations (November 1986-March 1990), and the post-liberalization period
outside of the buffer stock era. As with the statistics regarding spatial market integration,
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the data are separated into the primary and secondary regions on the basis of ex ante
government control over food marketing channels and the ex post condition of supporting
infrastructure. The regionally-differentiated effects of buffer stock operations and
liberalization on interseasonal price increases are striking, and quite consistent with the
findings of urban bias in price risk [Barrett 1995].
If the costs of seasonal storage, including interest, handling and commercial
storage losses, are on the order of 20-40 percent, as has been estimated by the Worid
Bank [1991a] and Azam et ale [1993], it is clear that most commodities have consistently
displayed unusually large interseasonal price increases. In the preliberalization period
only beans and rice in the secondary regions had average increases in this range.
Interestingly, during the pre-liberalization period the periodic increase in food prices was
generally less in the secondary regions, where government controls were less ubiquitous
and effective, than in the primary regions around the major metropoli. 19 This situation
was quickly reversed with liberalization, however, as the primary regions -

which

enjoy supetior access to credit, all-weather transport, and bulk commercial storagesaw much lower rates of interseasonal price increases. 2o Still, interseasonal price changes
lept with liberalization. Of the 57 commodity and region-specific price series in the data
set, 50 saw an increase in interseasonal rates, with 27 more than doubling from one
period to the next. 25 of the 57 series have averaged seasonal monthly price peaks more
than double the monthly minima since liberalization. The most likely reasons for the
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sharp rise in interseasonal price ratios are the tightening credit situation, the diminished
threat of government price controls, and the reduced role of the state societies, which,
unlike most private traders, enjoyed ample bulk storage capacity and credit to maintain
interseasonal stocks.
The rice buffer stock facility, introduced explicitly to temper sharp seasonal
increases in rice prices that emerged immediately following the most significant food
market liberalization measures, seems to have dampened interseasonal margins,
particularly in the primary regions, where three-quarters of the price series saw a decrease
in seasonal price rises from the pre-liberalization period to the buffer stock period. The
evidence is more mixed in the secondary regions where, except for rice, median price
rises are lower, but most price series evince greater seasonal price increases in the buffer
stock period than prevailed before liberalization. Since the facility operated almost
entirely in urban areas (especially Antananarivo and Toamasina, the principal storage
sites), it should come as little surprise that the positive effects of buffer stock operations
were concentrated in those regions.
The seasonal food price increases in Table 3 are not unusual for Sub-Saharan
Africa. For example, Coulter [1994] reports that interseasonal maize price increases in
Ghana average 120-170 percent across regional markets. He too emphasizes the
weakness of the financial sector as the proximate cause for substantial interseasonal price
variability: "a major reason for interseasonal price variability ... is the weakness of the
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financial sectors in most African countries. Most countries have embarked on financial
reform, ... but this is a slow process which often lags far behind reforms in grain
marketing. Moreover, after capital restructuring, bankers are generally conservative and
reluctant to lend to cereal traders, most of whom are unknown to them, keep no formal
accounts and are considered a poor lending risk" [Coulter 1994, p. 25].
Panseasonal official pricing and government-controlled credit rationing created
serious disincentives to the maintenance or expansion of private bulk storage capacity in
the pre-liberalization years. The resulting shortfall in storage capacity, and significant
concentration in the hands of a very few large trading houses, has created serious
problems for intertemporal arbitrage. Moreover, less than half of national commercial
stockage capacity is accessible year-round [Fivoarana 1989]; much of it is intended for
transactional, as opposed to interseasonal, inventories. Storage losses among big,
commercial traders are relatively low, at 1-3 percent annually [Azam et al. 1993; my
unpublished data]. On-farm loss rates, by contrast, are quite high: 11-26 percent,
depending on region, season and technologies employed [MPARAIFAO 1987]. So the
lack of interseasonal commercial storage facilities inevitably generates considerable
waste due to higher than necessary loss rates. High loss rates, private credit rationing that
generates quite high shadow interest rates, and the substantial problems of crop
movement when rural market demand peaks during the rainy season all combine to drive
exceedingly high interseasonal price variability. Liberalization appears only to have
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exacerbated this situation.

Conclusions
The empirical results from Madagascar support the hypothesis of countervailing
market relaxation and state compression effects of liberalization measures. Relatedly,
this paper demonstrates there are important interregional and seasonal differences in the
way price shocks are transmitted within Madagascar's food subsectors. These differences
mute substantially the influence central government policy measures have on the
incentives faced by rural consumers, producers and marketing intermediaries, an
influence presumed in the expectation of a robust supply response to improved prices.
These findings are consistent with the broader literature on African agricultural
liberalization, which emphasizes the twin necessities of dismantling inefficient and
inequitable state restrictions on trade and of improving the density and quality of
supporting infrastructure and services, particularly in communications, finance, storage,
and transport.
The World Bank [1991a, p.31] sums up its assessment of the generally sluggish
response of Malagasy agriculture to liberalization measures thus:
"A major reason which explains the limited supply response from the agricultural
sector is the pervasive deficiency of rural markets in Madagascar. Rural market
inefficiencies are related to four structural constraints: an inadequate rural
infrastructure, inappropriate government intervention and regulation on
commodity and input markets, inefficient provision of public services, and
deficiencies with the rural financial market."

26
In a similar spirit, Jayne [1994] points out that while improved crop productivity may
have substantial long-run potential, in the medium-run more efficient rural food
marketing networks may be more important to stimulating agricultural commercialization
and to the evolution of cropping patterns according to comparative advantage~ Generally
speaking, insufficient attention has been paid to issues surrounding the architecture and
functioning of agricultural markets in the design and implementation of policy reform
measures aimed at stimulating a strong, sustainable agricultural supply response. In
Madagascar, such oversights likely lie at the heart of the poor and uneven performance of
the agricultural economy in the wake of liberalization, and in the mixed effects of
market-oriented reforms on spatial and intertemporal market integration.
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Endnotes

* Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-3530
USA. Michael Carter and Jean-Paul Chavas provided helpful comments. Any remaining errors are the
author's alone.
1. That is, Pt+/Pt = R(1 +r)/(1-d), where t indexes time periods, R is a risk adjustment coefficient, r
is the real interest rate and d is the rate of decay of the commodity. While d is strictly nonnegative, r is
unrestricted. Indeed, achieving positive real interest rates where fmancial repression has long made them
negative has been an explicit objective of monetary reforms in African adjustment programs. R is also
unrestricted since the risks of speculative storage may be either negatively or positively correlated with the
stochastic returns to other assets [Chavas 1988].
2. Ghana is the obvious example. More than half the World Bank's disbursements in the initial
1983-1986 period of structural adjustment ($192 million) went toward rehabilitation of infrastructure and
services distribution systems, notably roads, ports, telecommunications, the power grid and water supply
[Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1991]. At the same time, the government began rolling back its interventions
in crop marketing, which had been relatively mild, by African standards, for food crops [Coulter 1994].
The reasonably robust response of Ghanaian agricultural productivity and supply [Barrett and Carter
forthcoming] and relatively efficient linkages among its domestic agricultural markets[(Alderman 1993]
likely follow in part from this parallel pursuit of improved infrastructure and governance.
3. By Lipton's defmition [1991, p.27], "market relaxation is the removal of restraints upon
movement of relative prices, quantities, and qualities of commodities and factors exchanged towards levels
that clear the markets." One should acknowledge, as Lipton does, that the case for market relaxation is not
new. Among others, Myrdal [1968] focused heavily on this theme.
4. Lipton [1991] suggests that this bias was initially due to extreme neoliberal ideology but since
the latter 1980s, and more durably, is due to protracted fiscal crises in reforming economies.
5. Klitgaard [1989] labels this phenomenon "incentive myopia" in his vivid description of the
perversities of economic reform efforts in Equatorial Guinea.
6. Of course, parastatals themselves have often been able to renege on contracts without penalty.
Delivery of promissory notes - payable only many months later in a highly inflationary environment instead of cash is but one too-common example.
7. Lipton [1991, p.27] puts it more colorfully: "Just as there is no free lunch, so there is no free
market; markets are expensive. Agricultural risk and information are so structured that growing state
involvement is usually a prerequisite of effective [market relaxation]."
8. Some studies [e.g., Pryor 1988, 1990] include Antsiranana and Toliary in the urban group
since they are among the largest population centers. For present purposes, however, they are excluded
because they were never well integrated into the national distribution network. Indeed, neglect of the far
south (Toliary) and the far north (Antsiranana) has been a cornerstone of regional political opposition,
most notably by the Toliary-based MONlMA party.
9. The data are thoroughly discussed in Barrett [1994b].
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10. Specifically, monthly real observations are divided by a twelve-month centered moving
average, in order to remove common trend and cyclical components in the data. The year-specific monthly
seasonals were then averaged to estimate a seasonal index (i.e., all the January specific seasonals were
averaged to generate the January index).
11. More general cross-correlation functions were also estimated to establish whether
contemporaneous correlations understate linkages that might be delayed due to contracts, imperfect
information flow or delivery lags. A cross-correlation function provides a dynamic generalization of the
simple (contemporaneous) correlation coefficient (i.e., k=O). The basic form is:
1

r

p1P2

(k) = [V(PI) V(P2)]

2

c

pIP2

(k)

N-Ic

N-1E (Plt-Jl 1)(PU.k-Jl2) ,
where cp p (k)
12

=

k~O,

t.~

-l~

N ~ (Plt- Jl I)(PU£Jl2)'

k<O

t . l-lc

Jl j is the mean of series i
V(Pj) is the variance of series i

The cross-correlation results generally support the contemporaneous correlation specification employed
here.
12. These are the six regions mentioned above as well as one (Itasy, immediately west of
Antananarivo) that has benefitted from a bevy of infrastructural projects over the past 6-8 years
[FAO/IFAD 1991; UNDPfMEP 1991].
13. Above this level variation in one price explains half or more of the variation in the other.
14. This paragraph draws heavily on Rabenarivo [1992].
15. The paragraphs on rural roads draw heavily from Barrett [1994a].
16. As well as the oligopolistic .organization of distribution.
17. 'Although there is no supporting data, these claims are widespread [Abt Associates 1991;
Deveze 1990; FAOIIFAD 1991; Hewitt 1992]. Much of this is likely attributable to the stress of prolonged
recession, but reduced real expenditures on policing, especially in rural zones, has no doubt facilitated the
growing problem.
18. When discussing road conditions, a surprising number of local officials invoke the words of
the early nineteenth century Merina king, Radama I: "If I make roads, the white man will only come and
take my country. I have two allies: forest (hazo) and fever (tazo)." The enemies may have changed, but
the strategy remains.
19. This reinforces Harriss' [1979a] claim that parastatal food marketing tends to amplify rather
than dampen seasonal price variability.
20. The one exception to this is maize, for which there is only one secondary region observation.
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Table 1
Proportions of Correlation Coefficients (in levels)

(percent)
Commodify

Minimally
Integratec:r
pre-lib post-lib

Structural
Change b
positive negative

Reasonably Well
In tegratecf
pre-lib
post-lib

Within primary regions'
Dried beans
Maize
Manioc
Potatoes
Rice

40
40
7
30
76

100
100
53
100
100

60
20
33
60
38

0
0
0
10
0

20
0
0
0
14

70
40
13
30
95

83
100
83
83
91

23
0
24
60
26

3
0
0
0
4

3
0
0
0
19

20
0
12
40
46

47

47

13

27

0

7

24
10
67

33
70
89

14
50
22

10
0
11

0
0
7

10
10
13

Between primary and secondary regions
Dried beans
Maize
Manioc
Potatoes
Rice

30
40
24
8
70

Within secondary regionse
Dried beans
Maize'
Manioc
Potatoes
Rice

Ho:p=O rejected in favor of positive one-sided alternative at the 5 percent or lower significance level.
b Ho:p pre =p post rejected in favor of a two-sided alternative at the 5 percent or lower significance level.
C Sample r> .70.
d Ambatondrazaka, Fianarantsoa, Imerina Centrale, Itasy, Mahajanga, Toamasina, Vakinankaratra.
e Antalaha, Antsiranana, Antsohihy, Farafangana, Fenerive Est, Maintirano, Mananjary, Morondava,
Taolagnaro, Toliary.
fMaize data are available for only one secondary region.
a
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Table 2
Proportions of Correlation Coefficients (in first differences)

(percent)
Commodity

Minimally
Integratecr
pre-lib post-lib

Structural
Change b
positive negative

Reasonably Well
Integratecf
pre-lib
post-lib

Within primary regionsJ
Dried beans
Maize
Manioc
Potatoes
Rice

0
10
13
0
19

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

17
0
24
0
33

30
0
7
8
7

30
0
2
0
1

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

13

7

0

0

0

0

19
10
9

19
0
9

5
0
0

10
10
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
7
0
14

40
30
33
20
67

Between primary and secondary regions
Dried beans
Maize
Manioc
Potatoes
Rice

13
0
5
4
10

Within secondary regionsJ
Dried beans
Maize e
Manioc
Potatoes
Rice
J

Ho:p=O rejected in favor of positive one-sided alternative at the 5 percent or lower
significance level.
b Ho:p pre ~p post rejected in favor of a two-sided alternative at the 5 percent or lower
significance level.
Sample r> .70.
d See Table 1 for list of regions.
e Maize data are available for only one secondary region.
a

C
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Table 3
Average Intra-annual Price Changes
(maximum/minimum monthly indices, by period)
(percent)
Commodity

Pre-liberalizationa Buffer stock periodb
median
median % decreasing'

Post-liberalization
median % decreasing'
C

Primary regionse
Dried beans
Maize
Manioc
Potatoes
Rice

42.9
82.4
59.2
65.0
47.1

19.9
57.1
75.9
22.7
37.7

100
60
50
80
86

51.0
137.2
103.9
81.0
94.6

0
20
17
40
0

28.8
67.2
106.3
46.7
38.9

27.1
32.5
70.2
44.3
40.0

50
100
57
40
40

69.5
60.6
158.9
102.7
119.6

0
100
14
20
0

Secondary regionse
Dried beans
Maize e
Manioc
Potatoes
Rice

Jan 1983-Dec 1985.
b Nov 1986-Mar 1990.
Jan-Oct 1986, Apr 1990-Dec 1991.
d Relative to the pre-liberalization period.
e See Table 1.
a

C

